Wembley stadium(A failed project) associated problems

When the projects are undertaken over an extended period of time it is very important for the consultancy and project team to manage them care fully including people from different departments from inside and outside of the business .Project management is all about managing these these resources in order in an order that it is delivered to specification,on time and within Budget .It is easy to see the impact of failed project management in works such as Wembley stadium.It damaged the reputation which hamper the ability to gain further work.Customers were very dissatisfied as they were hoping that it`s construction will be completed on time.Cost was so over runned that lead to huge loss of profit.This project damaged the relationship with sub-contractors and other business partners,financial penalties were paid to the workforce and there was a huge amount of low morale amongst the workforce.First we look at the Time,cost and The Legal battle over the Wembley stadium issue.

The first major problem concerning wembley stadium was the time and cost issue.wembley stadium was almost delayed for eight long years. Plans for a new national stadium have been dogged by delays, management problems and spiralling costs since Wembley was chosen in December 1996. The designs were unveiled in 1999. This was due to serveral problems .when the project first started it was delayed for two yrs due to financial and political difficulties but got underway in 2002.This guide to Multiplex paying penalties for the late finishing of the contract although they have threatened to sue WNSL over changes in the design which they suggest the main reason responsible for the project being late.The first problem was between multiplex and the steel contractor Cleveland Bridge ,Bridge walled away from the job in 2004 becouse they believe that they were not going to be paid for materials and there were irrevocable difficulties between two parties.On the other hand the temporary roof support which fell by over half a metre in march 2006 which resulted in the evacuation of 3000 construction workers and delayed work while inspections and reports were carried out .Later in march 2006 the problem of light came in context .The sewers under the stadium had buckled due to ground movement ,Remedial work was put into action for this and is currently nearing completion.It is also been claimed by multiplex that wrong type of concrete was used in the foundation

it has been argued that the australian firm multiplex which itself has been criticised for for the time delay actually suggests that the real blame lies with one of the UK`s biggest consultant Mott MacDonald .Multiplex bid for the job in 2000 and and the estimated construction cost was assessed at £326.5m by the time the bid was signed the cost rose to £445m the stadium should have been completed in 2003 but the work itself started in september 2002.Therefore the date was rescheduled to may 2006 for the FA cup final.By the end of the completion of the stadium the cost rose up to £757m.Multiplex at time was involed in a separate action against its former steelwork contractor at wembley has now outlined the case intends to take against Mott MacDonald.

It has been argued that Mott MacDonald`s design for the wembley steel work was not fit for purpose and the initial designs were not correct ,constructible,co-ordinated and consistent . Their was a letter issued by Multiplex which states that the 'services provided by Mott MacDonald throughout the project were unsatisfactory' and that 'Mott MacDonald's deficient design, failure to warn and/or take action is shown in many thousands of individual acts or omissions'. Multiplex claims that it has sustained significant losses as a result of a 'multitude of breaches of contract and/or acts of negligence' by the consultant, which had 'far-reaching effects' for Wembley.

The construction firm also alleges that its reputation in the UK market was 'substantially damaged' and intends to seek least £253m in damages, plus costs and interest - potentially the largest legal claim in British construction history.Peter Wickens, the chairman of MottMacDonald said that the letter received from Multiplex was intended to make a claim against consultancy which was actually the leader of the Mott Stadium Consortium(MSC).He added that the consortium was not responsible for the project management or construction which was clear responsibility of Multiplex . 'MSC emphatically denies any liability for Multiplex's loss and will vigorously defend any claim.'

Meanwhile, High Court hearings to decide whether British steel firm Cleveland Bridge (CBUK) owes any money to Multiplex for walking off the Wembley Stadium project are set to reach their conclusion in eight weeks. An original trial in 2006 found that CBUK was in breach of contract, but that neither side had won a definite victory in lawsuits against each other, leaving the situation unresolved.

Efficiency

Before the Wembley Stadium was built the aim the aim of it should have been to complete it, but a far more important aim to finish the stadium took over and everyone forgot to put their mind in just building it efficiently and cost effectively, and making it a state-of-the-art national stadium. The main priority was to build the stadium really quickly so it can hold the FA Cup final in May 2006. The priority of Multiplex should have been to aim to complete the stadium in a reasonable time, efficiently and not in a short time span.

If Multiplex did not have to rush the job, no problems would have occurred.

Comparing Emirates Stadium and Wembley Stadium Project they both had their share of problems but not all areas are equal in terms of the impact they make to a project, for example, the Wembley arch, was certainly a challenge but was it really that much of a technological challenge? But the public and stakeholder interests had a major difference between the two projects.

The least complex of projects can often end up with significant complexity through a lot of unclear requirements (particularly with fixed price contracts), like the Wembley stadium had with multiplex, the lack of senior management buy-in, relatively large number of stakeholder, project managing a contract (rather than project managing it), unrealistic deadlines (e.g. to build the stadium for the FA Cup final) and high public and media interest.

Planning should have been at the top of the project managers list, as once the old Wembley stadium was closed it was not immediately demolished it still stands an obvious clue to lack of confidence in the plan to replace it.

Handling

It was said that it was the wrong time in the season to start the work on the Wembley stadium and that the work was done far too fast in order to finish in time for the FA Cup final.

Chris Smith the former secretary of state for culture, media and sport defends himself against criticism of his handling of the Wembley stadium project.

“ Neither yesterday's Guardian front page criticising my handling of the Wembley Stadium project nor the select committee report on which it was based can, in the interest of fairness, be allowed to go unchallenged. Both contain serious misrepresentations and inaccuracies, and I wish to put the record straight.

I also want to address some of the fundamental issues that the select committee - in a rush for colourful publicity rather than an attention to the facts - seems to have missed. The fact, for example, that the decision to urge the removal of athletics from the Wembley stadium scheme was taken after careful consideration, and on grounds of practicality and value for money. And the fact that the commitment given by the Football Association to return £20m of lottery funds was a voluntary agreement, concluded with them, properly recorded and published, and that it remains due to be paid.

The Guardian's front-page report was wrong on a series of points. It says that I was repeatedly warned by officials not to meet with Ken Bates. In fact, no such warnings were given. It asserts that no civil servant was present. In fact a civil servant was present for the whole of the substantive discussion, a full minute was taken, and the agreement reached was subsequently followed up by correspondence. A public announcement was also made very shortly afterwards. The article claims that I agreed during the meeting that the FA be given the naming rights for the Wembley stadium. I gave no such agreement.

The select committee have alleged that the agreement for a £20m payment back to Sport England from the FA was somehow an "inept" treatment of public money. Quite the contrary. There was no legal obligation for the FA to pay back any funds at that stage. This was a voluntary payment, negotiated as a fair recompense for the decision to take athletics out of the Wembley scheme. The agreement remains in place, and the FA have on a number of occasions publicly committed themselves to making the payment. If the deal had not been achieved, no money at all would have been repayable. The first parts of the payment have been due to be made by now. That has not yet happened; and the FA should look to honour the obligations that they have entered into at the earliest opportunity. And of course there is a legal requirement for the entire £120m of lottery funds to be repaid in the event that no stadium proceeds at Wembley.

Behind the flurry of inaccurate accusations, however, lies a more fundamental issue: whether the search for a national stadium that could host both football and athletics was feasible or not. Initially I had thought it was going to be possible. But as the detail emerged during the latter part of 1999 of what was actually being proposed at Wembley, it became very clear that it was not a sensible idea.

The basic problem is this. A good stadium for football has to be tight around the pitch, so that all the spectators are as near as possible to the ac tion, and the atmosphere is as electric as possible. A good stadium for athletics has to accommodate a much wider running track, with good sightlines for all the spectators around the ground. It is impossible to achieve both objectives in the same venue. Some stadia - such as the Stade de France in Paris - find a compromise that involves retractable seating and gives a reasonable venue for both sports, but one that is not ideal for either.

The solution proposed for Wembley was different, and much less practical. The idea was to build a massive concrete platform in the middle of the stadium, which would take six months to construct, six months to demolish, and would cost somewhere around £20m, all for a 10-day athletics tournament. My judgment at the time was that this did not deliver either a good scheme or value for money. That is why I recommended the removal of athletics from the Wembley scheme; and I was absolutely right to do so.

The alternative plan that we then helped to work up, together with all the relevant organisations, was for a dedicated athletics stadium at Pickett's Lock in Enfield. This could have delivered an excellent site for the World athletics championships in 2005, and a long-term legacy for athletics. Both a high-class performance centre for elite athletes, and a community resource for schools and local athletics clubs, would have been left for the future. Unfortunately, the decision has now been taken not to proceed with this, and I regret that. But that reconsideration doesn't in any way invalidate the original choice of the Pickett's Lock site.

The role of a secretary of state is to take all advice and information into consideration, and reach a conclusion based on the best available facts. That is precisely what I did, in relation both to the issue of athletics at Wembley and the choice of Pickett's Lock, and I stand firmly by those decisions. I wish the select committee had acted in a similarly impartial way. ”